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Introduction
Historians of statistics will likely always debate the prove-
nance of the Thomas Mann–Whitney Houston collaboration 
that led to the eponymous U-test. Hence, it is vitally impor-
tant to document the origins of innovation that undergirds 
research, as it often involves more than simply the applica-
tion of existing methodology. This article tells a story about 
crime and a problem-solving methodological approach. It 
tells of analytic hoops we jumped through in our research 
examining why many types of crime have been falling in 
England and Wales (Figure 1) and elsewhere over the last 
quarter century.
The purpose of the story is to show how and why we 
focused on ‘data signatures’ to analyse the source of the puz-
zling and pervasive crime drops that began in many countries 
from the early 1990s (and a little earlier for some property 
crimes in the United States). Our focus on the data signatures 
found in the crime drop has been useful in eliminating many 
of the reasons that have been advanced for the crime drop as 
well as for corroborating one of them, at least for now (Farrell, 
2013; Farrell et al., 2014). 
The story begins in 2006 when we wrote our first research 
grant proposal on this topic, and at the time of writing in mid-
2015, our third sequential project is underway. It is begin-
ning to look like a research programme – almost as if we 
planned it (see, for example, Farrell, 2013, in press; Farrell 
and Brown, in press; Farrell et al., 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 
2014; Farrell and Tilley, in press; Tilley, 2012; Tilley et al., 
2011, 2015a, 2015b; Tseloni et al., 2010, 2012, 2014; Tseloni 
and Thompson, 2015; Van Dijk and Tseloni, 2012). Our 
overarching research question throughout has been: did 
security cause some or all of the massive drops in crime? To 
cut to the chase, our conclusion so far is as follows:
•• Security played a key role in the major falls in vehicle 
crime and domestic burglary, and probably other 
crimes including violence, over the last two decades.
The policy implications are huge: crime policy should 
more vigorously encourage the development of security for 
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those other crimes that are currently increasing. These 
include cyber-crime, theft of smartphones and similar high-
value portable electronics, and the growing prominence of 
organised crimes such as illicit trafficking of different types.
The realist deal
Key to the research has been a problem-solving approach, 
which is consistent with a realist orientation to evaluation 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Pawson and Tilley stressed the 
development of Context Mechanism Outcome Pattern 
Configurations (CMOCs). CMOCs refer to the causal 
mechanisms that are activated or deactivated when a pro-
gramme or policy is introduced in a range of contexts lead-
ing to changed regularities, producing an outcome pattern. 
The more precisely the changes in regularities can be specified 
through the CMOC conjecture, the more confidence can be 
had in the conjecture. The problem-solving counterpart to 
CMOCs is the development of interventions where prob-
lems are identified (‘Scanning’), casual mechanisms gener-
ating them analysed (‘Analysis’), measures developed that 
with undermine relevant mechanisms generating the prob-
lems (‘Response’) and evaluations undertaken to determine 
whether the problem has been eliminated or ameliorated 
(‘Assessment’). These terms form the acronym SARA, 
which was devised by Eck and Spelman (1987), and has 
been widely used to capture this process. In our work, we 
began with a puzzling outcome – steep, widespread and 
unexpected drops in crime rates – rather than a programme 
to assess. However, the approach we have adopted accords 
well with Pawson and Tilley’s realist evaluation and with 
Eck and Spelman’s SARA process.
In particular, the identification of a series of data signa-
tures has been critical to our work. Data signatures per se are 
not new (cf. Bowers and Johnson, 2004; Garwood et al., 
2000; Pawson and Tilley, 1997), but their formal demarca-
tion as a methodological tool for crime prevention research 
has been spurred on by Eck and Madensen (2009). They find 
that ‘The analysis of crime signature change, as part of crime 
prevention evaluations, can improve the internal validity of 
evaluation findings’. (Eck and Madensen, 2009: 59). They 
highlight the distinctiveness of the mechanisms associated 
with different situational crime prevention interventions and 
the associated outcome patterns that would follow from the 
activation of these mechanisms. Our triangulation work is 
consistent with three important points on signatures made by 
Eck and Madensen (2009: 69):
•• Signature changes consistent with expected interven-
tion mechanisms eliminate rival explanations;
•• Signature changes inconsistent with the expected 
intervention mechanism undermine the validity of the 
conclusion that the intervention produced the crime 
change;
•• The more specific and prominent the change in signa-
tures, the fewer viable candidate explanations there 
can be.
Figure 1. Crime survey for England and Wales 1981–2013 (incidence rates per 1000 households or adults).
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The more precisely an observed pattern accords with 
the expected signature, the more confident we can be in 
attributing causality to it, as also stressed by Pawson and 
Tilley.
A proto-realist evaluation, to which Pawson and Tilley 
refer as one of their exemplars, which also accords well with 
Eck and Madensen’s emphasis on crime signatures, is 
Laycock’s study of property marking in South Wales villages 
as a means to prevent domestic burglary (Laycock, 1985, 
1991). Overall falls in domestic burglary in the villages fol-
lowed introduction of the initiative. Laycock, however, 
‘directed her outcome measurements towards precise theo-
retically expected effects’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 91). 
One mechanism might involve retrieving stolen property and 
another detecting offenders with stolen goods. Both were 
measured but neither found. Laycock conjectured that inten-
sive and persuasive publicity leading to increased perceived 
risk to local burglars (remembering that the contexts was iso-
lated villages in a Welsh Valley), deterring them from offend-
ing, might comprise an important mechanism to generate 
falls in burglary (the initiative had been highly publicised 
when first introduced to encourage uptake in the villages). 
Cleverly, Laycock also tracked offending patterns after her 
first report was published and received positive publicity, 
and immediately subsequent renewed falls in burglary 
appeared to corroborate her conjecture. Her conclusion was 
that rather than the property marking per se producing 
the crime drop, it was the intensive and persuasive publicity 
that risks to local offenders were being increased. The out-
come signature was consistent with one but not the other 
explanation.
The specifics of the data signature approach as it relates to 
the historical crime drop on which our research focused 
should become apparent as the remainder of the article 
unfolds.
International relations
In parallel with the analysis described below, we examined 
the global crime drop. Back in 2007, it was not as well-
known that crime had declined in many countries, and we 
confirmed the general finding of others (Van Dijk et al., 2007 
in particular) and added to the knowledge base. We used 
the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) which is a 
unique resource as the only cross-national standardised 
general victim survey (Mayhew and van Dijk, 2014). It has 
been conducted every 3–5 years since 1989 across many 
countries, with small but representative national or city sam-
ples and an identical questionnaire. This means its findings 
are widely comparable, unlike police statistics which have 
definitional reporting and recording differences, and national 
crime surveys, which have definitional and survey methodol-
ogy differences (Van Dijk and Tseloni, 2012).
We examined five volume crime types – domestic bur-
glary, theft from the person, theft from car, car theft and 
assault – using multivariate multilevel regression modelling 
in an innovative manner: treating the different time periods 
of country-level data as repeated measures within each coun-
try to test for a linear or non-linear trend. Three of the insights 
this provided will be highlighted here (see Tseloni et al., 
2010 for the full story). First, cross-nationally, domestic bur-
glary and car theft were the first offences to decline, and they 
did so from the first ICVS sweep in 1988. Theft from the 
person and theft from cars began their decline with the 1995 
sweep with assault declining from the 2000 sweep. Second, 
volume crime drops were roughly similar across countries 
except for burglary which, to the extent that could be deter-
mined with the more fragmented available data, fell faster 
outside Europe, North America and Australasia. Third, in 
addition to displaying common cross-national trends, the 
crimes of burglary, theft from the person and car theft were 
highly correlated cross-nationally, while assault appeared 
strongly related to burglary and car theft.
The international analysis is an important counterpart to 
the analysis that follows. The likelihood that crime declined 
rapidly by chance in many countries at a similar time is van-
ishingly small. For us, this implies the possibility of a com-
mon cause which first impeded car thefts and burglaries then, 
perhaps via a spill-over effect, other crime types including 
violence. In addition, it means that we suspect our England 
and Wales-oriented work, described below, has broader geo-
political implications.
Our argument is, thus, that the data signatures we exam-
ine, although relating largely to one country, suggest more 
general patterns and hence a way of addressing a major puz-
zle in criminology. Of course to corroborate this, what we 
have done would need to be replicated by research in other 
countries to determine whether similar distinctive signatures 
are found there also.
The other logistic regression
We used the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW, 
formerly the British Crime Survey) as our main data source. 
It provides data for crimes occurring in 1981 onwards, was 
conducted infrequently in the 1980s, biennially in the 1990s 
and continually since 2001/2002. A key feature is that it gath-
ers much additional information including some on security 
measures, albeit with varying consistency over time.
We will skip past most survey method issues here, but 
experienced readers will know that the task of analysing sep-
arate sequential data files such as those of the CSEW is an 
immensely time-consuming task which necessitates great 
attention to detail. Each annual survey sweep requires sepa-
rate analysis with new code to be written. It requires signifi-
cant skills such as repeated reorganisation of the files – or 
what is known to us as the other logistic regression. So we 
are surprised and thankful to have made it thus far, and have 
two exhausted research assistants – who ruthlessly aban-
doned the team once they got their PhDs – to show for it.
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It’s a sign of the crimes!
We started by analysing car theft, in part because we believed 
its decline to be under-researched (see Farrell et al., 2008). 
The first three signatures we identified provide information 
on the causal role of security. If opportunity is driving car 
theft, then we would expect to see some specific changes 
where security measures are introduced to reduce it.
1. The average age of stolen vehicles should increase 
because newer vehicles have better security.
2. Door lock-forcing should decline much more than 
other means of entering vehicles, due to central dead-
locking systems.
3. Temporary theft for joyriding and transportation 
should decline sooner and faster than permanent 
thefts for chopping and re-sale – because younger 
less experienced offenders were more easily deterred.
We find that all these expectations are met. The change in 
means of entry to vehicles is shown as Figure 2 by means of 
example.
We were able to replicate the results with Australian data 
and added a fourth signature to the repertoire when we hap-
pened upon a natural experiment:
4. In Australia, electronic vehicle immobilisers were 
introduced in one state (Western Australia) in advance 
of elsewhere. Car theft fell sooner in that state and 
then fell in the rest of the country, both times tracking 
the spread of security (Farrell et al., 2011b).
Note that the statistical signatures only make sense when 
informed by the theoretical mechanisms by which different 
types of security device ought to work: we have information 
on central locking, electronic immobilisers (but also mechan-
ical immobilisers – often the awkward old steering wheel 
clamps known as clubs or crook-locks), car alarms and track-
ing devices – and this aspect of the work is described next.
Competing explanations for the drop in car theft would, of 
course, have also to be consistent with these specific patterns.
Auto crime and autocorrelation
After releasing an early version of part of the work in a news-
letter (Farrell et al., 2008), we were astonished at the speed 
with which teams in other countries replicated and extended 
it (though some may have evolved in parallel). By now, with 
some variation in method and data, the finding that security 
caused the fall in car theft appears true for Australia, England 
and Wales, the Netherlands and the United States (Fujita and 
Maxfield, 2012; Van Ours and Vollaard, 2013), with support-
ing evidence on the effectiveness of electronic immobilisers 
from Germany and elsewhere (Bassman, 2011; Brown, 
2013). Not only does the replication bode well, but since 
automobile security was improved (often by legislation) at 
different times in different countries, together the studies 
provide the fifth signature:
Figure 2. Means of entry to vehicles 1995–2010 (CSEW).
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5. The timing and trajectory of the spread of security in 
different countries appears to track the introduction 
and spread of electronic vehicle immobilisers.
Although it was not part of the research by the present 
authors, some confirmation of the likely importance of secu-
rity was identified by interviews with offenders in Australia 
(Brown, 2015). Offenders were asked why they thought 
property crime had declined and the most popular response 
was that it was due to security.
But which security devices work best? And which work 
best for different types of car crime? Here, we included theft 
from cars as well as vandalism, initially comparing crime 
rates for cars without security to those with particular types. 
This evolved into what we termed the Security Impact 
Assessment Tool (SIAT). The SIAT uses odds ratios of the 
likelihood of crime when particular security devices, or com-
binations, are present, to tease out their relative crime pre-
vention effects (Farrell et al., 2011a). The term we adopted 
for the measure this generates is the Security Protection 
Factor, or SPF, which is the same acronym as Sun Protection 
Factor – and both measure the units of time, relative to the 
absence of protection, after which the user is burnt. An exam-
ple of SIAT output is shown later for burglary. Conceptually 
though, what it does is quantify the effectiveness of different 
combinations of devices. The SPFs are our sixth statistical 
signature and told us that:
6. Specific security devices and their combinations vary 
greatly in their security effectiveness, which varies 
by crime type, and these patterns fit with theoretical 
expectation.
We found tracking devices to be very effective against 
car theft but they were not around much in the 1990s when 
crime plummeted. Of devices that were, we found elec-
tronic immobilizers to be the most effective, mechanical 
immobilisers and central locking systems to be also quite 
effective, alarms only modestly effective, and other 
devices (window etching, parts marking) of little use. 
Theft from vehicles is more likely to be interrupted by 
central locking than electronic immobilisers, which makes 
sense since a car with only the latter remains easy to break 
into but is harder to steal. Car alarms only ever had a mod-
est effect, but it was larger against theft from cars, which 
also makes sense (i.e. conforms with theoretical expecta-
tion of how the preventive mechanism works) as the less 
experienced offenders committing these crimes are more 
easily deterred.
An important finding is that devices work much better 
when used in combination. That is, combinations of good 
devices produced non-linear benefits. Electronic immobilis-
ers and central locking were dominant but cars with those 
plus an alarm and a tracker were found to have a car theft 
SPF of 25 against theft – that is, to be 25 times safer than a 
vehicle without security. The importance of combinations of 
devices was confirmed in subsequent analysis of household 
security devices and burglary which is detailed next.
Alarming implications
The focus shifted to domestic burglary for the second main 
strand of the research. Building on the car theft work, we 
applied the SIAT to household security devices. This was 
more challenging because of the larger number of burglary 
devices recorded in the CSEW. There were nine devices in 
total which in principle produce hundreds of combinations. 
We identified the most prevalent devices and combinations 
and focused our analysis on them. We found that burglary 
security devices, individually but especially in certain com-
binations, are much more effective than car security. As 
expected, some work better than others and combinations are 
particularly effective, sometimes exponentially so. You can 
rest easy if you have the combination of: Window locks, 
Internal lighting on a timer, Door deadlocks and External 
sensor-lighting, which in our shorthand became the WIDE 
combination (we had long been using one-letter abbrevia-
tions to summarise the myriad permutations), as shown in 
Figure 3 (‘External & Internal lights, Window & Door 
locks’).1 We found WIDE to provide 49 times the protection 
of ‘no security’ against burglary. So to prevent burglary, not 
just the more the merrier, but the WIDEr the better (Tseloni 
et al., 2014; Tseloni and Thompson, 2015).
An unanticipated finding from our research – but one that 
in some ways gives it that real-world feel – is the finding that 
burglar alarms appear to be largely ineffective (Tilley et al., 
2015). Although there has been previous research into house-
hold security devices, most of it tends to group security 
devices together, so it is possible this has been missed. While 
it has long been known that most alarm activations are false 
(Litton and Pease, 1984; Sampson, 2011) and therefore may 
not mobilise much formal or informal surveillance, it was a 
largely unanticipated finding that warrants further research.
Sneaky measures
Two things were particularly troublesome in the early stages 
of the research into household burglary – so much so that 
they potentially falsified the security hypothesis. The first 
was that, even before burglary plummeted in 1993, a fair pro-
portion of households already had some security of different 
types. The second was that while there was a significant 
increase in security levels when burglary fell, it was too 
modest to account for the fall. So how, we pondered, could 
security be responsible if there was already a fair bit of it and 
if it failed to increase hugely?
The answers appear to be quality and combinations. We 
strongly suspect the quality of security devices dramatically 
improved from the early 1990s – but that this is masked in 
the simple counts of the prevalence of individual devices. 
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Finding a signature to test this conjecture was challenging. 
To try to do so, we developed a sneaky measure that drew on 
how we had examined car theft, and looked at how offenders 
gained entry (with inspiration for sneaky measures from 
Garwood et al., 2000). We grouped entry methods into two 
broad types:
•• Forced entries – where security was overcome, includ-
ing lock-forcing on doors or windows, the removal or 
breaking of door panels or windows;
•• Unforced entries – where no security was overcome 
including unlocked doors, entry with a key, pushing 
past the occupant or use of deception.
If it was security that improved, then the signature we 
would expect is that burglaries where security was involved 
would fall sooner and faster than the others. This is what 
occurred, shown in Figure 4. The issue is most evident 
when means of entry via doors or windows are examined 
separately. It is clear that a reduction in forced entries 
accounted for the bulk of the decline in household burglary 
whereas other types of entry declined less and declined 
later (Figures 5 and 6). While this does not directly show a 
change in the quality of devices, it does show that it was 
forced rather than unforced entries that declined, for which 
the best explanation we can come up with is more and bet-
ter security.
While the data were imperfect, we were also able to gain 
some insight into the use of combinations of devices. 
Unfortunately, the best data were only available from 1998 
onwards but we extrapolated the trends backwards. Rather 
uncannily, the extrapolated trends identify a dramatic 
increase in the use of combinations of the WIDEr more 
effective devices in the early 1990s at the time when bur-
glary began to fall. The same data imperfections meant the 
proportion of households without any security devices 
appeared to have fallen dramatically in the early 1990s due 
to different definition of ‘no security’ prior to the 1998 
CSEW. These signatures dovetail well with the analysis of 
between-device variation in effectiveness and previous 
analysis of the role of combinations of devices against car 
theft.
So, there is mounting evidence that security may have 
induced the fall in household burglary. But how and why 
would security have spread and improved? We anticipate 
that the improvement in security occurred via the spread of 
home improvements, particularly insulation and double-
glazing (sometimes termed storm windows). Double-glazed 
windows have two tougher panes of glass, and have stronger 
frames such that breaking them is more difficult. Further, 
double-glazed windows and doors tend to have built-in rather 
than add-on locks which means they are more likely to be 
used (the awkward nut on the bolt is not left lying around or 
lost). Figure 7 shows the spread of fully double-glazed 
households in the United Kingdom and the drop in burglary 
in the 1990s, and while the data are incomplete across the 
timespan of the decline in burglary, they are at least some-
what indicative.
Figure 3. Security protection factors (SPFs) of selected burglary security home features based on the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW.
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This burglary analysis is detailed in a study that is under 
review for publication at the time of writing but versions of 
the findings were presented at the conference to mark the end 
of our funded research on burglary and an international 
conference (Farrell et al., 2015b; Tilley et al., 2015). 
Independent support appears to derive from the recent work 
of Brown (2015) in Australia. Offenders were asked why 
they thought crime had declined and the most popular 
response was that they believed it was due to security.
Looming violence
What about violence? This is probably the biggest question 
remaining and the topic of our more recently awarded 
research grant. We suspect that security played a key role 
both directly and indirectly. For some crimes such as rob-
bery, the effect is likely to have been direct. Banks and com-
mercial stores, buses and taxis have all introduced an array of 
improved security measures to reduce robberies. A recent US 
Figure 4. Household burglary – means of entry, 1992–2011 (CSEW).
Figure 5. Forced and unforced door entry, 1991–2011.
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study demonstrated that taxi-driver homicides fell in the 
1990s in those cabs with security cameras installed, relative 
to a control group without (Chaumont Menendez et al., 
2014). Older readers will remember the days when bus driv-
ers carried a large bag of fare monies – the days before cor-
rect-payment by machine and a secure drop-box for cash. 
Late-night shops now tend to have limited cash on the prem-
ises and an array of design improvements. We anticipate that 
these and other measures reduced violence in and around 
many public and private premises and spaces. Robbery 
disproportionately results in homicide, and other homicides 
are assaults-gone-wrong, so their decline may have reduced 
homicide as a natural statistical consequence.
Alongside the adoption of security technology to protect 
their cars and homes, individuals may have become more 
crime risk-averse, adopting or modifying their routine 
Figure 6. Forced and unforced window entry, 1991–2011.
Figure 7. Increasing double-glazing and declining burglary, 1996–2008.
Farrell et al. 9
activities to reduce their exposure to stranger and acquaintance 
violence, especially in night-time economy (Ganpat et al., 
2015; Garius, 2015). Here, the distinct signature would include 
reduced levels of exposure to risks of stranger violence in pub-
lic places and hence lower levels of actual violence among 
previously highly victimised groups showing enhanced pre-
cautionary behaviour. However if ‘street’ crime is more dif-
ficult due to security it is possible that this also nudges 
adolescents to stay indoors.
We are also exploring the indirect effects, that is, how 
falling property crime may have reduced violence. It may 
surprise some generalist readers to learn that most ‘career 
criminals’ are not specialists. That is, they tend to commit 
different types of crime across the spectrum of property and 
violence – including sexual victimisation and domestic vio-
lence (Farrington, 1998; Piquero et al., 2014; Richards et al., 
2013; Smallbone and Wortley, 2004). Since most crime is 
property crime, they commit mainly that plus a small amount 
of violence. Perhaps much of that violence is committed 
while undertaking, following-through on, or in the wake of 
completed property crimes, which could mean the reduction 
in property crime has triggered some of the broader reduc-
tions in violence. So, for example, acquisitive property crime 
is a precursor of fencing, and car theft may be a precursor to 
crime requiring a getaway vehicle such as suburban burglary. 
We term this the keystone hypothesis because the removal of 
the volume property crimes may, like the removal of the key-
stone in an arch, have caused all the other crime types to 
tumble.
The second main indirect route we are examining is the 
debut crime hypothesis. This involves examining the extent 
to which early-career offenders who are stifled if their debut 
crimes – mainly shoplifting, car theft and other property 
crimes – do not progress to commit the broader array of 
crimes including violence. The signatures for this might 
include falling levels of acquisitive criminal activity among 
younger offenders followed by falls in violence as they reach 
later adolescence, while levels of violent behaviour are 
maintained in other cohorts whose onset of criminality has 
not been inhibited by increases in security relating to typical 
debut crimes. Promising evidence on changing criminal 
career patterns speaks to this hypothesis (Farrell et al., 2015b). 
Hence, we suggest that while there is a great need for further 
research into security and the violent crime drop, there are 
some promising avenues to pursue.
Conclusion: of signatures and 
significance
Triangulation from a variety of data signatures and sources 
is, statistically speaking, an oddity. If one indicator has, say, 
a 5% chance of error, then two independent indicators, 
for example, based on different data sources, imply a 
(0.05 × 0.05 = 0.0025) 0.25% chance and three, a 0.0125% 
chance, and so on. With the broad range of data signatures 
identified to different data, plus some near-replications from 
other countries in relation to the car theft and burglary work, 
and since these findings fit with theoretical expectation at 
different levels plus there is reason to anticipate some broader 
application of these findings, then what, statistically 
speaking, is the chance of error? Well do not look at us 
because we do not know. But we now feel fairly safe sug-
gesting that there is good evidence to support the security 
hypothesis while recognising that a long and winding 
research road lies ahead.
And we hope for responsible criticism and attempts at fal-
sification, and challenge researchers to identify suitable data 
sources that facilitate such efforts. But we would also ask 
readers to identify plausible alternate hypotheses that could 
account for the various data signatures described herein, for 
we cannot. For example, when considering a rival hypothe-
sis, first consider why it might reduce forced but not unforced 
entry to households. Then run it past some of the other signa-
tures because a plausible rival hypothesis should be consist-
ent with each one.
Crime drop research falls increasingly into the domain of 
modern history. It will require archival research and imagi-
native efforts to pursue. Trawling through the records of 
security manufacturers, insurers, construction companies, 
the market research industry, business groups and others, 
could shed light on where, when and what security develop-
ments occurred and were implemented. In-depth interviews 
with experts including ageing offenders or ex-offenders (see 
Brown, 2015) and experts involved in security at and around 
the time, are required. The clock is ticking on the last aspect 
because the likelihood of retirement of domain-specific 
experts increases daily. Other sources of information should 
emerge as the work progresses, consistent with the nature of 
the investigative triangulation approach.
The most important policy conclusion suggested by the 
research is that society should put time and effort into encour-
aging elegant security solutions. The process can, we feel, be 
accelerated. Government should assist the corporate sector in 
reducing its crime emissions – products and practices that 
generate volume crimes: it took decades to get secure cars, 
and we should have had secure phones long ago, while there 
is scope for Internet service providers to secure key compo-
nents of the Internet much more immediately. And society has 
a significant comparative advantage over even the most adap-
tive of offenders. This story of our use and abuse of statistical 
data signatures and theories of causal mechanisms has been a 
key component of how we reached this conclusion. Rather 
than arrest for the wicked, we advocate elegant design and 
secure solutions that remove crime opportunities.
What we have described here is a research programme 
that embodies iterative progression and the development of 
multiple data signatures to test context-mechanisms outcome 
pattern conjectures relating to security improvements and the 
crime drop. This investigative triangulation approach sits 
within the realist evaluation framework: confidence in a 
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conjecture can be multiplied where successive signatures 
corroborate one another and where alternative explanations 
can be compared for their consistency with signatures. The 
idea of multiple ‘signatures’ specifically comes from situa-
tional crime prevention and was initially formulated for eval-
uating small-scale interventions to address specific crime 
problems. We suspect that the method has more general 
application and its use in this article is intended to illustrate 
this and to encourage others working in different fields. 
There are many sources of data collected using many differ-
ent methods. To mix metaphors, just as we need to select 
ingredients from a well-stocked larder to cook a bespoke 
dish, so too we need to look to data source larders to select 
the ingredients to empirically test our hypotheses. In refer-
ring to a dish, we hope the culinary allusion is not too 
abstract, for we regularly taste each doughy signature as it … 
proves.
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Note
1. The SPF values in Figure 3 are all statistically significant 
(p ⩽ 0.05; one-tail test) except for window locks.
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